The Anatomy of Electoral Hijacking in Somalia – A Historical and Contemporary Analysis

Publication: Somali Research & Policy Center (BRC)
Date: December 2025
Report Code: BRC-EI-2025-01

1.0 Introduction: The Recurring Syndrome

Somalia’s political history since independence in 1960 is, in large part, a chronicle of failed transitions and hijacked electoral processes. This report argues that the current political crisis surrounding the planned 2026/27 elections is not an anomaly but the latest manifestation of a recurring syndrome: the use of state machinery and constitutional manipulation by an incumbent to engineer an election that consolidates personal or clan-based power, thereby subverting the democratic will and triggering national collapse. By examining key historical precedents—the collapse of democracy in 1969, the engineered elections of the 1980s, the manipulated Arta process of 2000, and the indirect election crises of the 2010s—this report establishes a clear pattern. It then applies this analytical framework to the current administration of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, demonstrating through direct statements and actions that his government is following this established playbook, thereby justifying the Kismayo Conference as a necessary constitutional intervention.

2.0 Historical Precedents: The Pattern of Hijacked Transitions

2.1 The 1969 Watershed: Democratic Erosion and Military Coup
Somalia’s first democratic experiment ended in 1969 not with a popular revolt, but with a military coup that followed a deeply flawed and divisive election. The 1969 parliamentary elections were marred by widespread allegations of vote-buying, clan-based manipulation, and the misuse of state resources by the ruling Somali Youth League (SYL). The assassination of President Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, who hailed from a different clan than the Prime Minister, exposed the lethal fragility of a system where power was seen as a clan prize rather than a national trust. The ensuing political vacuum and public disillusionment provided the pretext for Siad Barre’s coup. Scholar I.M. Lewis noted this was not a rejection of democracy per se, but a collapse caused by elite corruption and the failure to create credible, inclusive institutions. The lesson: when elections are perceived as a zero-sum clan competition rigged by incumbents, the entire state becomes vulnerable.

2.2 The 1980s: The “99.9%” Election and Totalitarian Consolidation
By the 1980s, Siad Barre’s regime had perfected the art of electoral farce as a tool of dictatorship. The 1985 presidential referendum, where Barre was reported to have received 99.9% of the vote, was a performative exercise in total control. It served to legitimize his rule externally while terrorizing the population internally. This period demonstrates how a hijacked election can be weaponized to entrench a dictatorship, eliminating all pretence of political choice and directly fueling the armed opposition that would eventually topple the state.

2.3 The Arta Conference (2000): The Genesis of the 4.5 Formula and its Manipulation
The Arta peace process in Djibouti was a genuine attempt to rebuild a state from total collapse. It produced the Transitional National Government (TNG) through a clan-based selection process (the 4.5 formula). However, the TNG’s legitimacy was immediately contested because key armed factions and political leaders were excluded or marginalized. The process was seen by critics as externally driven and easily manipulated by those with access to the conference table. This established a post-1991 pattern: inclusive processes create fragile legitimacy; exclusive or manipulated processes create immediate conflict.

2.4 The 2009-2017 Era: Indirect Elections and “Cash-and-Clan” Politics
The indirect election model used for the parliaments that elected Presidents Sheikh Sharif Ahmed (2009), Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (2012), and Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo (2017) institutionalized a different form of hijacking. While avoiding direct violence, these elections were routinely hijacked by a combination of massive foreign cash inflows, blatant vote-buying of regional delegates, and intense clan lobbying. The infamous “$50-$100 million” figures reported by the UN Monitoring Group regarding the cost of parliamentary votes underscore this reality. Each election led to accusations that the outcome reflected financial and clan muscle, not political program or public will, resulting in governments with narrow, contested bases of support from their first day in office.

3.0 The Current Crisis: Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and the 2026 Playbook

President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s first term (2012-2017) was itself a product of the flawed indirect system. His second term, however, reveals a more ambitious strategy to fundamentally alter the rules to secure permanent dominance.

3.1 The Strategy: Constitutional Hijacking for Electoral Advantage
The government’s approach mirrors the historical playbook but with a veneer of legalism:

• Step 1: Control the Rules.Unilaterally amending the provisional constitution to centralize power in the presidency, bypassing the required inclusive review process and referendum.
• Step 2: Control the Referee.Undermining the independence of the National Independent Electoral Commission (NIEC) and other oversight bodies, ensuring they are staffed by loyalists.
• Step 3: Marginalize the Competition.Systematically excluding pivotal stakeholders—specifically the governments of Jubaland and Puntland and the national opposition—from the electoral design process, violating the essence of federal partnership.
• Step 4: Weaponize the State.Using the national army, police, and intelligence services not for national security, but to intimidate opposition strongholds, as seen in the deployment to Gedo, Jubaland, and the alleged political use of security forces in Mogadishu.

3.2 The Evidence: In Their Own Words
The warnings from Somalia’s most experienced political figures are consistent and damning. They are not speculation; they are testimony from those who have seen this pattern before.

• On the Illegality of the Process:
  • Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni:“Dastuurka maalintii la fur furay ayaa la banaystay wax kasta oo sharci daro ah oo la sameeyay” (“The constitution was buried the day it was opened; every action since has been illegal.”). This is a direct indictment of the government’s entire legal foundation.
  • Former Prime Minister Abdi Farah Shirdon:“Doorasho baaqatay dowlad la’aan iyo 91-dii wixii dhacay wax kasii xun ayey na dhaxalsiinaysaa” (“An election you are calling for will bequeath us statelessness and something worse than 1991.”). This frames the current path as existential, not procedural.
• On the Strategy of Exclusion and Control:
  • Former President Hassan Ali Khayre:“Madaxweynoow… talada kaligaa kaama go,do dhuulka dhig hadii kale dalkaan meel halis baad u wadaa” (“Mr. President… you cannot govern alone. Share power or you are leading the country to a dangerous place.”). This identifies the core problem: a refusal to govern inclusively.
  • Jubaland President Ahmed Madobe:“Madaxweyne Xasan Sheekh waxaan ku kala maqanahay inuu idhahay Doorasho uma baahnid aan wada joogno ana waan ka diiday” (“I fail to understand the President saying ‘we don’t need an election while we are together.’ I have refused that.”). This exposes the President’s false narrative of consensus.
  • MP Abdirahman Abdishakur:“Waxaad arkeysaa nin Wasiir Federaal ah oo ku dhahaaya ‘hebeloow maxaad Kismaayo iyo Garoowe u aaday’ sow dal soomaali ma ahan” (“You see a Federal Minister saying ‘clansman, why did you go to Kismayo and Garowe?’ Is this not a Somali country?”). This reveals the government’s divisive, clan-based framing of legitimate political assembly.
• On the Humanitarian and Security Consequences:
  • Former President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed:“Dadkii boobay Hantida Qaranka qabiilad ayey uga shaqeynayaan, Muqdisho waa talaabo iyo qori, amni ma ahan waxaas” (“Those looting state assets work for clan interests. Mogadishu’s way is one of militarism and force, not security.”). This links governance to predation and violence.

4.0 The Kismayo Conference: A Constitutional Firewall

Faced with this historical pattern repeating itself, the Kismayo Conference represents a collective, constitutional defense mechanism. Its 17-point communiqué is a direct response to each step of the hijacking playbook:

• It rejects unconstitutional amendments (Point 3).
• It demands an agreed, not imposed, electoral commission (Point 5).
• It sets a deadline for inclusive dialogue (Point 6).
• It condemns the use of security forces for political coercion and land grabs (Point 10).

This is not a secessionist movement. It is a coalition of former heads of state, federal state leaders, and parliamentarians—the very architects of the post-2000 order—using the last available peaceful means to halt a slide into dictatorship. As presidential candidate Abdulqadir Cosoble Ali stated, “Shirkaani ma aha qori in la qaadanaayo ee wanaag Soomaaliyeed ayaan ku tashanaynaa” (“This conference is not about seizing power by force; we are consulting for Somalia’s good”).

5.0 Conclusion and Recommendations

History is unequivocal: when Somali electoral processes are hijacked by incumbents for personal or clan gain, the result is state collapse, insurgency, or dictatorship. The evidence demonstrates that President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s administration is executing a classic hijacking strategy. To support this process in the name of “stability” is to guarantee catastrophic instability.

Therefore, the Somali Research & Policy Center (BRC) concludes that:

1. The Kismayo Conference is a legitimate and necessary constitutional intervention by key national stakeholders to prevent an illegal consolidation of power.
2. The international community must immediately shift its stance. Diplomatic and financial support must be conditioned on the Federal Government’s good-faith participation in inclusive dialogue with the Kismayo coalition before the 20 January 2026 deadline.
3. The principle of “Somali-owned” must be redefined to mean “owned by a cross-section of Somalia’s federal and political constituents,” not solely by the incumbent in Villa Somalia.

The choice is clear: learn from the catastrophic lessons of 1969, 1991, and the contested elections of the 2000s, or repeat them. Supporting the inclusive alternative articulated in Kismayo is the only path to a legitimate and stable political future for Somalia.

References & Sources:

• Lewis, I.M. A Modern History of the Somali(4th Ed.). James Currey, 2002.
• United Nations Monitoring Group Reports on Somalia (Various, 2009-2017).
• Provisional Federal Constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia (2012).
• War Murtiyeed– Final Communiqué of the Kismayo Opposition Conference, 20 December 2025.
• Compiled public statements and speeches by cited Somali political figures (November-December 2025).
• Historical accounts of the 1969 election, the Arta Conference, and subsequent transitional processes from Somali academic and journalistic archives.